By declaring redemption, the farmer replaces himself in the same position as the third party
\npurchaser, in the sense that a kind of restitutio in integrum of the cultivator takes place, with effect ex
\ntunc.
\nCase law has posed the question of whether the right of retraction arises at the time of the act of
\nsale of the rustic fund to a third party, or at the time when the formality of the
\ntranscription; and responded by stipulating that the direct cultivator who owns the neighboring land
\nwith that alienated acquires the right of redemption at the time and by the effect of the sale and not from the
\nits transcription, which only sets in motion the time limit for the exercise of redemption ( cf. Cass.
\nJuly 26, 2001, no. 10220).
\nCase law has further clarified that the right of redemption arises when it has been
\nenacted the transfer of the fund to a third party, violating the rules on preemption in favor of the
\nsubject favored by law (direct farmer on the land or direct farmer owner on the
\nneighboring fund).
\nThe Supreme Court has clarified that the right of redemption applies both to the preemption of the cultivator of the fund
\nalienated, either because of the neighbor’s preemption, because the reference made by Art. 7 of Act 817 of
\n1971 in the first paragraph of Art. 8 of Law 590\/1965 applies to the change made to the term of
\ninsistence on agricultural land (reduced from four to two years), but also includes in the recall the
\nretracted, lest the purpose of the preemption itself be frustrated (cf. Cass. September 29, 1995, no.
\n10272).
\nA simple negotiated declaration by the farmer that he wishes to exercise the right of redemption is enough to
\ntrigger the substitution of the farmer himself for the third-party purchaser of the agricultural land, and not
\nJudicial action must therefore be taken. The purpose of court action is not to constitute redemption,
\nBut only to declare its existence. Evidently it will be necessary to bring court action
\nIf you intend to exercise the redemption on terms other than those resulting from the deed of sale to the
\nthird.
\nRedemption must be exercised within one year from the transcription of the purchase deed, otherwise the
\nwhich is not interrupted or suspended as a result of the grower’s declarations. La
\nSupreme Court jurisprudence states that the peremptory nature of the deadline must be taken into account
\nstatutorily mandated time limit for the exercise of retraction, and further argues the irrelevance of the
\nreasons why the retraction action could not be exercised (cf. Cass. Cass. January 14, 1984,
\nn. 310; Cass. October 4, 1991, no. 10388; Cass. March 9, 1999, no. 2004).
\nWhere the deed of transfer of the agricultural land to a third party is disguised, the time limit shall run from the
\nDate of transcription of the apparent contract.
\nFinally, it seems worth noting that, according to the dominant case law and doctrine, retraction operates when the third party’s purchase has taken place:
\n(a) Without any communication to the farmer from the alienating owner;
\n(b) With incomplete communication with respect to the act put in place;
\n(c) Before the expiration of the deadline for acceptance by the grower;
\n(d) Without the grower being offered the same conditions as those offered to the third party;
\n(e) In fractional parts of the fund, while the farmer had been offered the fund as a unit;
\n(f) After the farmer has agreed to purchase, but before the transfer of ownership to him or her has occurred as a result of a deferment of payment of the price (see Supreme Court September 25, 1972, No. 2779; Supreme Court April 18, 1975, No. 1478; Supreme Court October 2, 1984, No. 4867; Supreme Court April 13, 1988, No. 2931; Supreme Court December 14, 1979, No. 6525; Supreme Court November 21, 1986, No. 6846; Supreme Court January 12, 1988, No. 114).<\/p>\n
Attorney Chiara Roncarolo<\/p>\n
Attorney Maurizio Randazzo<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
By declaring redemption, the farmer replaces himself in the same position as the third party purchaser, in the sense that a kind of restitutio in integrum of the cultivator takes place, with effect ex tunc. Case law has posed the question of whether the right of retraction arises at the time of the act of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1577,1583],"tags":[],"yoast_head":"\n