News Supreme Court rulings July 2015

Damages for ‘window cleaner anxiety’ arrives. And it is the municipality that has to pay them
In ruling no. 13568/2015, the Supreme Court stated that the discomfort that may be caused to motorists by the presence of window cleaners at traffic lights could originate the inclusion within our legal system of a new declination of existential damage, that generated by “window cleaner anxiety.”
Specifically, according to Supreme Court justices, the anxiety and inconvenience that may result to motorists from the presence of window washers at traffic lights could result in municipalities taking contingent and urgent measures to protect public safety and urban security.
The court then clarified that any damage suffered by an anxious motorist, who had raised the issue, would not result from the failure of the owner agency to take care of the road, but from the municipality’s failure to exercise authoritative powers.

Vacation home infested with insects and pests? Not enough to convict the owner
The Supreme Court of Cassation, in ruling no. 22384/2015, ruled that finding the home rented for vacation infested with mites, fleas and vermin does not automatically result in the application of a criminal penalty against the owner of said home and/or the real estate agency that arranged the trip. And this, the Court continued, even if minor injuries to the unfortunate guests were to result from the stings of the said insects.
Indeed, the Ermellini specified that for the purposes of conviction, the foreseeability of the event that occurred must be ascertained taking into account the state of deterioration of the property and the amount of insects present there as well as the behavior of the owner and/or the real estate agency in terms of adopting every possible suitable measure to protect their guests.

Calling a public official a “cop” is not always contempt

A recent Supreme Court ruling (No. 25903/2015) shows that calling a public official a “cop” does not always constitute the offense of contempt.
According to the Supreme Court judges, in fact, in order for the aforementioned offense to be configured, in addition to the requirement of publicity, it is necessary that the offending phrase take on an objectively disparaging value of the person to whom it refers. Indeed, the said statement must be so offensive as to cause harm to that special form of decorum and respect inherent in the figure of the public official and, moreover, must not constitute a manifestation of mere criticism of the person to whom it is addressed.